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I. INTRODUCTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) (GATT), the prin-
cipal multilateral agreement governing international trade,2 reduces
tariffs and other restrictions on international trade.3 The contracting
parties to GATT generally limit trade restrictions in order to in-
crease employment, promote economic growth, and promote full
utilization of natural resources. 4
However, the benefits of trade liberalization under GATT are
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, AN INTRODUCTION TO INT'L TRADE LAW 2-3 (1982).
3. GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at Al 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196.
4. See id. The economist Paul Samuelson stated,
there is essentially only one argument for free trade or freer trade, but it is
an exceedingly powerful one, namely: Free trade promotes a mutually prof-
itable division of labor, greatly enhances the potential real national product
of all nations, and makes possible higher standards of living all over the
globe.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 8 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]. GATT intends to accomplish the above stated goals by
eliminating all unnecessary governmental interference. GATT, supra note 1, at A 1l,
55 U.N.T.S. at 196.
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threatened by environmental regulations that apply internationally,
whether they are established by an individual nation or by an inter-
national organization.5
The issue of extraterritorial application of environmental law
reached a defining moment when a GATT dispute panel6 recently
held that the United States had violated GATT by enforcing a prohi-
bition on the importation of certain yellowfin tuna from Mexico. 7
The fundamental issue addressed by the tuna panel was whether,
under GATT, one member state may impose its environmental regu-
lations on other member states. 8 There was no indication that the
5. SEYMOURJ. RUBIN & THOMAS R. GRAHAM, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 3 (1982).
The United States has actively pursued freer trade since GATT was instituted. Id. at
4.
6. A dispute resolution panel under GATT is an ad hoc group established to
resolve disputes between member countries. Members of the panels are experts on
the subject matter of the dispute. LYONETTE LouIS-JACQUES, GATT/TRADE LAw: A
GUIDE TO SOURCES OF INFORMATION 4 (1990). (A report prepared for the AALL Sum-
mer Institute "International Law: The Basics and Beyond" Minneapolis, MN, June
12-15, 1990).
Dispute panels currently are the favored form of dispute resolution mechanism
under GATT. JOHN H.JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 63 (1990) [here-
inafterJAcKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATIT]. This has not always been the case. When
GATT was first established, disputes were resolved at the biannual meeting of the
contracting parties. Disputes subsequently were handled by the intercessional com-
mittee and later by a working party comprised of representatives of member states.
The dispute panel came to prominence in 1955 because the working parties did not
effectively resolve disputes. Id.
A panel report in itself has no power. The report must be submitted to the
GATT Council of Representatives, which operates by consensus. A losing party may
block the report by voting against it. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT supra at 67. A
blocked report does not become legally binding. Id. Blocking, however, has not
been a significant problem. Most of the panel reports in the past forty years have
been adopted. Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of Interna-
tional Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 578, 591-92 (1990-91).
7. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc.
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) at 37-47 [hereinafter U.S. Tuna Panel]. This tuna panel in-
volving the United States and Mexico should be distinguished from the tuna panel
involving Canada and the United States, see infra note 63. The United States enacted
the prohibition pursuant to the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).
16 U.S.C §§ 1371-1407 (1988). The tuna affected by the ban were caught by means
of purse seine nets. Purse-seining is a practice of fishers who take advantage of the
fact that, in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, yellowfin tuna swim beneath schools of
certain species of dolphins and porpoises. The fishers set their nets around the dol-
phins to trap the tuna; many of the dolphins become entangled in the nets and are
drowned. This practice is often referred to as "setting on" or "fishing on" the ceta-
cean. Laura L. Lones, The Marine Mammal Protection Act and International Protection of
Cetaceans: A Unilateral Attempt to Effectuate Transnational Conservation, 22 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 997, 998 (1989).
8. GATT Dolphin Decision's Implications on U.S. Health and Environmental Laws,
Hearings on CA TT/Dolphin Issue Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Hear-
[Vol. 18
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GATT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
tuna panel considered the environmental impact of its decision,9
which evoked a strong reaction from environmental groups.O
This comment employs the tuna panel decision as a means to show
that a unilateral environmental regulation is inconsistent with GATF
and that GATT must accommodate environmental regulations in or-
der to achieve its long-term trade objectives."I Part I provides a
brief history of GATT in order to illustrate its shortcomings as a gov-
erning document. Part II analyzes the tuna panel decision and ad-
dresses other relevant issues not raised by the tuna panel. Part III
posits an alternative framework for resolving environmental disputes
utilizing the existing GATT structure.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
GAT had an inauspicious beginning.12 GATT began as part of a
system of economic regulation devised at the Bretton Woods Con-
ference in 1944.13 The system originally devoted itself to interna-
tional monetary and banking concerns. 14 The Bretton Woods
Conference leaders, however, saw the need for an International
Trade Organization (ITO).t5 GAT was intended to be one part of
ings on GATI (Ralph Nader testified: "Now, a GATT panel has ruled that a U.S.
environmental law is an illegal barrier to trade and must be eliminated.") Id. See also
Keith Bradsher, U.S. Ban on Mexico Tuna Is Overruled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1991, at
CI, C3.
9. See generally U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7.
10. Bradsher, supra note 8, at C3.
11. Id. Free trade is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. The goal of
GATT is to raise the standard of living of member countries. Consequently, environ-
mental restrictions are not, in fact, contrary to GATT. Rather, the restrictions fulfill
GATT's policy of improving the standard of living. GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at
All, 55 U.N.T.S at 196.
When the environment is damaged by free trade, the standard of living declines.
In addition, preventative measures embodied by environmental regulations are, in
many cases, much less expensive than remedial measures. See RUBIN, supra note 5, at
3.
12. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 30-39. Interna-
tional economic relations are often governed by treaties such as GATT, which create
organizations to resolve disputes. Generally, GATT trade panels do not create bind-
ing secondary authority. In practice, however, previous trade panel decisions are, at
least, persuasive authority. Id. at 89-90.
13. Id. at 32.
14. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 6, at 9. Two factors helped
bring the GATT into existence. First, the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
delegated power to the president to enter into agreements to lower tariffs. From the
various agreements entered into under this Act came many of the substantive articles
embodied in GATT. Second, protectionist measures spurred by the Great Depres-
sion in turn slowed international trade. During World War II, many leaders saw the
need for a regulatory system for international trade. Id.
15. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 27-28.
1992]
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the ITO, but the ITO was never ratified by the U.S. Congress. 16
Consequently, other members abandoned the organization.17
GATT, however, remained.'
8
As a result of the dissolution of the ITO, the Bretton Woods sys-
tem had no mechanism to govern international trade.19 GAIT was
the natural choice to meet that need,2 0 but it lacked the comprehen-
sive authority necessary to govern international trade.
2 l
As its role changed from a loose association of trading states to the
primary agreement governing international trade, many additional
countries joined in the agreement.2 2 Today, GATT plays a central
role in governing trade.2 3 But in spite of its role as the cornerstone
of international trade for many decades, there remains some ques-
tion whether GATT is flexible enough to survive the changing condi-
tions of international trade.2 4
16. Id. at 12. An international agreement can become the law of the United
States if: (1) it is accompanied by the advice and consent of the Senate (a treaty), (2) it
is authorized or approved by Congress and the matter falls within the constitutional
authority of Congress (a congressional-executive agreement), (3) it is authorized by a
prior treaty which received the advice and consent of the Senate (an executive agree-
ment pursuant to treaty), or (4) it is based on the President's own constitutional au-
thority (a sole executive agreement). RE'STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw § 303 (1987).
There is some debate about whether GATT is binding under U.S. law. Compare
Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990) with John H. Jackson, The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250 (1967).
17. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 6, at 12-13.
18. Id. GATT survived because the United States was negotiating under the au-
thority of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Id. The authority of the act
had been renewed in 1945. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at
33. The Act did not authorize the President to enter into an agreement which estab-
lished an organization. It did, however, authorize agreements for the reduction of
trade restrictions. As a result, GATT is carefully worded so as not to imply the insti-
tution of an organization. For example, when a decision is made pursuant to the
GATT, it is the contracting parties acting jointly and not by an organizational body.
GAIT, supra note 1, art. XXV, 61 Stat. at A68, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272-75.
19. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GAIT, supra note 6, at 15.
20. Id.
21. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 33.
22. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 33. Originally, there
were 23 contracting parties. LouIs-JAQuEs, supra note 6, at 2-3. Presently, there are
over 100 contracting parties. Keith Bradsher, Trade Proposal Draws Lukewarm Response,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at Cl.
23. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND 12-13 (1984)
[hereinafter JACKSON, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND]. Since its inception, GATT
has conducted multilateral negotiations called "rounds" which are aimed at the re-
duction of trade barriers. Id. There have been seven rounds, and GATT is now
nearing completion of the eighth. LouIS-JAQUES, supra note 6, at 3.
24. JACKSON, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23 at 1.
[Vol. 18
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III. THE MEXICO-UNITED STATES TUNA PANEL REPORT
A. Facts
During the past three decades, there has been an increase in the
use of "purse seine"25 nets to catch tuna and other species of fish.26
This presents a special problem in the Eastern Tropical Pacific where
tuna school beneath dolphins.2 7 In order to catch the tuna swim-
ming below the dolphins, fishers intentionally encircle and net both
the tuna and dolphins.28 Large numbers of dolphins are killed each
year in the region by the use of purse seine nets.
29
On August 28, 1990, the United States imposed a prohibition on
the importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu,
Panama, and Ecuador. 3O The prohibition was enacted pursuant to
the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).3t The United
States lifted the prohibition on September 7, 1990, for Mexico, Ven-
ezuela and Vanuatu after the Commerce Department found the
countries in compliance with the MMPA.32 Panama and Ecuador
were later exempted after they stopped using the purse seine
method of fishing.33 On October 19, 1990, however, the prohibition
was reinstated against Mexico until such time that the Commerce De-
partment could document the percentage of dolphins killed by the
Mexican fleet over the period of an entire season.3 4
Pursuant to GATT, on November 5, 1990, Mexico requested con-
sultations with the United States concerning the prohibition on the
25. For a definition of "purse seine," see supra note 7.
26. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Hearings on GA TT, supra note 8 (testimony of David Phillips) (on file with the
William Mitchell Law Review).
30. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing an injunction against the Secretary of Commerce
on the importation of tuna caught in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection
Act).
31. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 2-3. "The Secretary of the Treasury shall ban
the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have been caught
with commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental
serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2) (Supp. 1991).
32. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 4.
33. Id.
34. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). Subse-
quently, an appeals court, on November 14, 1990, ordered the embargo to be stayed.
Id. at 1452 n.3. The appeals court lifted the stay on February 22, 1990. U.S. Tuna
Panel, supra note 7, at 5. The United States Customs Service instituted a further em-
bargo on April 3, 1991, which required importers of yellowfin tuna and "light meat"
tuna products that contained some yellowfin tuna to prove the tuna was not fished
with purse seine nets. Id. The embargo expired on March 26, 1991. Id.
1992]
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importation of tuna.35 These consultations failed to resolve the dis-
pute. Consequently, Mexico requested that the contracting parties
establish a dispute resolution panel pursuant to article XXIII:2 of
GATT.36
B. The Panel's Analysis
The panel first sought to determine whether the U.S. prohibition
was consistent with GATT.37 According to GATT, the tuna panel
had to determine whether the United States was in violation of
GAT and, if so, whether an exception to GATT would nonetheless
permit the U.S. import restrictions to stand.3 8 The United States ar-
gued that the prohibition pursuant to the MMPA was an internal re-
striction enforced at the time and point of entry and, therefore,
should be controlled by article III.39 Mexico, for its part, argued that
the measures were quantitative restrictions controlled by article XI.40
35. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 5.
36. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 5. Article XXIII:2 reads as follows:
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties con-
cerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in
paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly in-
vestigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be con-
cerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropri-
ate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such con-
sultation necessary.
GAT, supra note 1, art. XXIII:2, 61 Stat. at A64-5, 55 U.N.T.S. at 268. For a de-
scription of the process involved in bringing an article XXIII panel, see infra note
120.
37. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 37-39. In addition, the panel examined sev-
eral related issues. First, the panel considered the prohibition of imports from inter-
mediary nations based on the MMPA. The panel found that the embargo on imports
of certain yellowfin tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products from intermediary na-
tions was inconsistent with GATT under article XI. Id. at 48.
Second, the panel analyzed the possible extension of each import prohibition by
the MMPA and section 8 of the Fisherman's Protective Act (the Pelly Amendment) 22
U.S.C. § 1978 (1988). The panel dismissed this argument as it would require ajudg-
ment on something that has not happened. Since the amendment has not been insti-
tuted, nothing has occurred contrary to GATT. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 42-
43.
Finally, the panel considered the application of the Dolphin Protection Con-
sumer Information Act (DPCIA). This act allows tuna fished in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific to apply a "dolphin safe" sticker only when the tuna has been fished in a
manner other than by purse seine nets. The panel found that the DPCIA was not in
violation of the GAIT. Id. at 49-50.
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1. Article III
The panel first conducted an article III analysis.41 Article III, the
National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation, creates an
obligation not to discriminate against importing countries.42 It is a
counterpart to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) article, which seeks
to control discrimination between GATT signatories by requiring
them to afford each other the most favorable trade terms available.43
The national treatment obligation is a corollary to MFN status as it
requires that imported products be treated the same as domestic
goods.44
The national treatment obligation states that internal taxes, other
charges, laws, regulations and requirements may not be used to pro-
tect domestic producers against competition from imported prod-
UCtS. 4 5 In addition, it requires that internal taxes or other internal
41. Id.
42. The relevant sections of article III read:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indi-
rectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover,
no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the prin-
ciples set forth in paragraph 1.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offer-
ing for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Note Ad Article III. Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law,
regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in [Article III:I] which
applies to an imported product and the like domestic product and is col-
lected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point
of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to
in [Article III:I], and is accordingly subject to the provision of Article III.
GATT, supra note 1, art. III, (62 Stat. 3679, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204-09) (as amended and
restated by the Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of GATT).
43. See GATT, supra note 1, art. I, 61 Stat. at A12-13, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-201.
The MFN article imposes an obligation in international trade on member states to
accord GATT signatories the most favorable treatment they offer any state. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 133.
44. John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff Barriers, 10 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 207 (1989).
45. See GATT supra note 1, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18. 55 U.N.T.S at 206.
19921
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charges on imported products not be imposed in excess of restric-
tions on domestic products.46 While internal restrictions with
protectionist intent are forbidden under the national treatment obli-
gation, internal restrictions with no intent to protect domestic indus-
tries may also be barred.47 As a result, the national treatment
obligation is at the center of many disputes.48
The national treatment obligation intends to control only those
products that enter the stream of commerce of the importing coun-
try. 49 In the Mexico-U.S. tuna case, the panel found that the restric-
tion was imposed at the time and point of importation, as required
by the national treatment obligation.50 The panel noted, however,
that the MMPA did not regulate tuna or tuna products, but rather
regulated the manner in which tuna were caught.5 ' The panel con-
cluded that, because dolphins were not the product being imported,
tuna could not be regulated as a means of controlling the killing of
dolphins.52 The national treatment obligation thus did not justify
the U.S. prohibition against tuna imports because the MMPA sought
to regulate the production process.53
A GATT dispute involving a French tax on automobiles further
illustrates the distinction between regulation of a product and a pro-
duction process. 54 A French law which taxes all automobiles exceed-
ing sixteen horsepower clearly is regulation of a product.55 If the
law taxes all automobiles manufactured in factories that discharge a
specified amount of pollution, however, the measure is aimed at the
regulation of a process.
Regulating a product directly within a country's borders is a per-
missible function of that government. The national treatment obli-
gation, however, allows the regulation of products only within the
regulating country. 56 When a country projects its environmental
policies on another country by attempting to regulate the production
process, the affected country's sovereignty is diminished. This result
46. Id.
47. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 189-90.
48. Id. As of 1989, there had been 233 disputes brought to GATT; 31 of these
were regarding article III. Id. at 367 n.4.
49. See GATT supra note 1, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18. 55 U.N.T.S at 204-09.
50. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 40.
51. Id. at 41.
52. Id. at 41.
53. Id. at 39-42. The panel noted that, because article III did not justify the U.S.
prohibition on the importation of Mexican tuna, the U.S. was, in fact, in violation of
article III:4. Id.
54. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ANALYTICAL INDEX, art. III-
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is impermissible under article III.57
The problem becomes even more complex when the exporting
country is not subject to any restriction while the importing country
maintains significant environmental restrictions. Naturally, the cost
of producing goods in the importing country, reflecting regulatory
costs, is higher.58 Accommodating these costs is problematic be-
cause environmental regulations affect the manufacturing process, 5 9
and the national treatment obligation demands that like products be
treated alike regardless of the manufacturing process.60 Conse-
quently, a country cannot adjust its taxes on imports to accommo-
date a higher standard of environmental protection.61 This result
frustrates many environmentalists because the country with the least
environmental protection enjoys an advantage in international
trade.62
2. Article XI
After concluding that the national treatment obligation of article
III did not apply to the U.S. prohibition against the importation of
Mexican tuna, the panel next analyzed the tuna dispute under article
XI. Disputes arising from a conflict between GAIT and prohibitions
57. Id. at 111-12.
58. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 208-209. To off-
set this disadvantage, the author posits several suggestions:
Could the importing nation take a countermeasure such as (1) impose a ban
(or limitation) on imports of goods which are manufactured by processes
which cause health, safety, or environmental problems; or (2) impose an
additional charge at the border on the imported goods, to equal the amount
of the cost which domestic producers incur through compliance with health,
safety, or environmental standards; or (3) impose a tax on all goods, domes-
tic and foreign, related to the cost of the regulation; then rebate that tax to
domestic manufacturers or subsidize them so as to offset their costs of
compliance?
Id. at 209. The author concludes that these suggestions probably will not be
adopted because article III does not allow discrimination on the basis of differences
in the exporting country or its manufacturing environment. Id.
59. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 209.
60. See GAT[, supra note 1, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204-209.
61. Id. Border tax adjustments provide an exception to this rule. An importing
nation may impose a tax on imported goods equal to a tax on a domestic product.
Border tax adjustments must be borne by the product and not by the producer. Ex-
amples of taxes borne by the product include sales tax, value added tax, and excise
tax. The United States, however, does not generally employ this type of tax. Instead,
the United States relies on direct taxes such as corporate or income taxes. The latter
type are not eligible for border tax adjustment. Therefore, the United States is un-
able to take advantage of this equalization procedure. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 194-97.
62. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 194-97. If the
pollution from the factory producing the product affects the importing country di-
rectly, a remedy may be found in international tort law. Id. at 210.
1992]
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or restrictions legislated by a contracting party typically are resolved
under article XI,63 which disallows quantitative restrictions and
prohibitions.64 However, article XI contains an exception for import
restrictions and prohibitions on any agricultural or fisheries products
if those restrictions are necessary to the enforcement of measures
which similarly restrict the production of like domestic products. 6 5
Such laws do not violate GATF.
There is an important distinction between the general rule prohib-
iting trade restrictions and the exception dealing with agricultural
and fisheries products. The first provision disallows all restrictions
and prohibitions on the importation of products.66 The second pro-
vision is an exception that allows import restrictions, but not
prohibitions, on agricultural and fisheries products. 6 7 GATT con-
63. See, e.g., United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Can-
ada, GAIT Doc. L./5198 (Feb. 22, 1982), reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAR-
IFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 91, 96 (29th Supp.
1983) [hereinafter Canada-U.S. Tuna Panel].
64. GATT, art. XI(I) provides:
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the terri-
tory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XI(I), 61 Stat. at A32, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-26. Quantitative
restrictions include limits on quantity or value of a product permitted to be imported
or exported. ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, GAT PLUs-A PROPOSAL
FOR TRADE REFORM 20 (1976).
65. GATT, supra note 1, art. XI:2(c)i, 61 Stat. at A33-A34, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-
229.
The provisions of article XI do not extend to:
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in
any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which
operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be
marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of
the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can
be directly substituted; ...
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any prod-
uct pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice
of the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be imported dur-
ing a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or value.
Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such as will
reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as
compared with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule
between the two in the absence of restrictions. In determining this propor-
tion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing
during a previous representative period and to any special factors which
may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product concerned.
Id. art. XI:2(c)i, 61 Stat. at A33-A34, 55 U.N.T.S. at 226.
66. Id. art. XI:2(c)i, 61 Stat. at A32, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-29.
67. Id. art. XI:2(c)i, 61 Stat. at A33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 226.
[Vol. 18
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss2/7
GATT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
tains no exceptions for outright prohibitions on these products.68
In the Mexico-U.S. tuna case, the panel found that the U.S. prohi-
bition on tuna imports violated article XI.69 The United States did
not submit arguments to the contrary. 70 As indicated, the agricul-
tural and fishery products exception does not extend to prohibitions
of imports. Accordingly, the MMPA could not have qualified for the
exemption from article XI.71
Had the MMPA instituted only a partial restriction to achieve its
end, the agricultural and fishery products exception may have ap-
plied. 72 Such restrictions may be consistent with GATT. However,
there is another significant barrier in the text of the exception. The
restriction on the importation of tuna would have to be "necessary"
to enforce the restriction of tuna caught by U.S. fishers. 73 There-
fore, if the unlimited importation of tuna contravened the purpose of
the domestic supply restriction, a partial restriction could have been
instituted to maintain the effectiveness of the domestic restriction.
In a similar case, the Canada-U.S. Ice Cream Panel74 found certain
circumstances must be present before trade restrictions would be
deemed necessary. 75 Canada claimed that imports of U.S. milk, ice
cream, and yoghurt would render ineffective its policy aimed at re-
stricting supply in order to subsidize domestic farmers.76 The panel
decided the "necessary" threshold was not met because the regula-
68. Id. art. XI:2(c)i, 61 Stat. at A33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 226.
69. U.S.-Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 42.
70. U.S.-Tuna Panel, supra, note 7, at 42. The likelihood of success would have
been minimal had the United States argued for an exception under article XI:(c)(i).
Previous dispute panels have recognized distinctions between XI:I and XI:2(c)(i).
Namely, article XI:1 disallows prohibitions and restrictions, while article XI:2(c)(i)
provides an exception for restrictions on agricultural and fisheries products. See supra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text. Therefore, if the United States had argued that
the prohibition should be excepted pursuant to article X:2(c)(i), it likely would have
met defeat because the MMPA was a prohibition not a restriction.
71. U.S.-Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 42.
72. See supra note 70.
73. GATT, supra note 1, art. XI:2(c), 61 Stat. at A33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 226. Consid-
erable time has been devoted to defining the term "necessary" because the interpre-
tation of the word is often dispositive. See GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 54, at
XI-II to XI-12.
74. Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, reprinted in GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC DOCUMENTS AND SELECTED INSTRUMENTS
68 (36th Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Canada-U.S. Ice Cream Panel].
75. Id. Necessity is one of seven criteria used in deciding whether a given domes-
tic restriction will be held consistent with article XI:2(c). Exceptions such as article
XI:2(c) are construed narrowly, making it difficult to meet the threshold. The burden
assures that any error will fall in favor of freer trade. Id. at 72-85. The substantial
nature of the burden is consistent with the GATT policy toward the liberalization of
trade. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76. Canada-U.S. Ice Cream Panel, supra note 74, at 74.
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tion was not necessary to support an internal supply restriction. 77 In
practice, dispute panels rarely allow the use of this exception.78
3. Article XX
The United States argued that, although contrary to article XI:I,
the prohibition could be justified under article XX(b) or XX(g). 79
Article XX provides a general exception to the other GATT provi-
sions.80 The preamble to article XX states that countries cannot em-
ploy GATT exceptions to create unjustifiable discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.81 Dispute panels gener-
ally examine the application of the law rather than the law itself.82
a. Article XX(b)
Once a dispute panel determines that a domestic environmental
measure is neither discriminatory nor protectionist in nature, ac-
cording to the article XX preamble, an exception under article XX(b)
may be allowed if two further requirements are met.8 3 First, article
XX(b) authorizes environmental legislation that affects a prohibition
77. Id. at 93. In addition, the panel found that Canada did not comply with the
"like products imported in any form" standard. This standard dictates that like prod-
ucts are not merely products with a common origin. Rather, the imported products
must be directly competitive with the product governed by the supply restriction. Id.
at 86-93.
78. Id. at 84-85.
79. Article XX reads in relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domes-
tic production or consumption ....
GATT, supra note 1, art. XX:l, 61 Stat. at A60-A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
80. Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from other provisions of
GATT. It is not a positive rule and does not establish obligations. Panels therefore
interpret article XX narrowly, and the burden of persuasion lies on the party invok-
ing the exception. Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, reprinted
in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC DOCUMENTS AND SELECTED
INSTRUMENTS 140, 164 (36th Supp. 1990).
81. GATF, supra note 1, art. XX:1, 61 Stat. at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
82. GATF ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 54, at XX-4. The tuna panel first
looked at the requirements set out in the preamble of article XX. Satisfied that the
restriction was neither a discriminatory nor protectionist measure, the panel analyzed
the sub-parts of article XX. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 44.
83. See supra note 79.
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or restriction so long as it is "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health."84 Trade panels have historically construed
"necessity" narrowly.85
In the Mexico-U.S. tuna dispute, the United States argued that,
because there was no alternative manner by which to protect dol-
phins, the MMPA was necessary to accomplish the conservation of
dolphins.86 The GATT panel, however, did not approach the neces-
sity of the MMPA prohibition directly.87 Rather, it disallowed the
application of the article XX(b) "life or health" exception on the ba-
sis of a second criterion, jurisdiction.88
The panel noted that the basic question was whether the life or
health exception applied outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country.89 The panel recognized that the text of GATT does not
directly address this issue and considered both the history and effect
of an extraterritorial application of the life or health exception.90
The panel concluded that under the interpretation suggested by
the United States, an importing country could impose its life and
health policies on other nations.91 Moreover, the nations affected by
the extraterritorial application of environmental regulation would
have to comply with the regulation or jeopardize their rights under
GATT.92 As a result, GATT would provide legal security only for
those countries with identical life or health policies. 9 3 On the basis
84. See supra note 79. Health and sanitary regulations have sometimes been con-
venient devices for accomplishing protectionist ends. Ted L. McDorman, The GATT
Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins,
and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, at n.288 (1991) (citing KENNETH
DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 1, 192-95
(1970)).
85. See, e.g., Canada-U.S. Ice Cream Panel, supra note 74, at 91-92.
86. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 44.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 44. Professor Jackson argues that the focus of article XX should be on
products rather than the production process, which is similar to the analysis under
article III. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 209. Article III
permits regulation of a product and allows a country to maintain certain controls. See
supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
Professor McDorman states that a broad reading of article XX(b) would allow an
unlimited application of trade barriers. MCDORMAN, supra note 84, at 522. The
MMPA sought to protect dolphins outside the territorial waters of the U.S. The ra-
tionale on which the MMPA is based seems to be that even though the dolphins are
not presently in U.S. territorial waters, they may be in U.S. waters in the future;
therefore the United States has a right to protect the dolphins. McDorman states that
the unconvincing connection between the prohibition and protection of dolphins
would not be allowed under article XX(b). Id.
90. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 44-45.
91. Id. at 45.
92. Id.
93. Id. Another probable result of a broad interpretation of article XX(b) is that
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of these considerations, the panel found that the U.S. prohibition
against Mexican tuna and tuna products could not be applied outside
the jurisdiction of the United States.
94
b. Article XX(g)
The application of article XX(g) must also be consistent with the
requirements of the article XX preamble in two respects. First, the
measure must not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion. 95 Second, the measure must not be a disguised restriction on
international trade.9 6
Article XX requires that the domestic measure be "primarily
aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources within
the jurisdiction of the enacting country. 9 7 Although the text of arti-
cle XX(g) says that GATT will not be interpreted to bar domestic
smaller exporting countries would see a decrease in their ability to legislate in-
dependent life and health policy measures. The decrease in sovereignty would be at
the hands of nations with the most purchasing power. The alternative to conforming
with the economically more powerful nations would be to face trade restrictions.
94. Id. at 46.
95. See supra note 79.
96. See supra note 79.
97. Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT
Doc. L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1988), reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 98 (35th Supp. 1989) [herein-
after Canada-Herring Panel].
The panel examined whether export prohibitions on unprocessed salmon and
herring "related to" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources under article
XX(g). The panel noted that the article is unclear as to how closely related the trade
restrictions must be to conservation goals. The panel in its analysis then looked to
the language of subparagraphs (a), (b), (d), and (j), which state the measure must be
"necessary" or "essential" to the achievement of the policy purpose. Subparagraph
(g) imposes a lesser standard and refers to measures "relating to" the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources. Id. at 114.
The panel concluded that the "relating to" language in (g) was "merely to en-
sure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit
of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources." The panel
adopted a standard requiring that conservation measures must be "primarily aimed"
at achieving the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Moreover, the panel
held that the export restraints on salmon and herring were not general prohibitions
because they merely limited access to certain unprocessed forms of salmon and her-
ring. Thus, the prohibitions were not "primarily aimed at" the overall conservation
of salmon and herring stocks. Id.
A panel formed under the auspices of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
directly discussed the "primarily aimed at" test:
In the Panel's view, [the ultimate basis for] the "primarily aimed at" test...
[is whether] the [trade restrictive] measure would have been adopted for
conservation reasons alone.... In order to apply this test, the Panel consid-
ered that it must examine the objective factors that go into a decision to
adopt such a measure, including the conservation benefits that the measure
itself would produce and whether there is a genuine conservation reason for
choosing the actual measure in question.
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measures "relating to" the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources, a previous panel held that "relating to" can be interpreted
only to mean "primarily aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources. 98
In the Mexico-U.S. tuna case, the United States argued that the
measures mandated by the MMPA were "primarily aimed at" render-
ing effective a domestic measure to conserve dolphins.99 Mexico
counterargued that the exhaustible natural resources exception
could not have extraterritorial application.' 00 The GATT panel
found that the prohibition instituted under the MMPA was not, in
fact, primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins.10 1 The panel
was convinced that the means chosen to achieve the goals of the
MMPA could result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or dis-
guised trade restriction.102 For example, Mexico, in order to comply
with the MMPA limit on killing dolphins, would need to know con-
temporaneously how many dolphins U.S. fishers killed.103 The
MMPA states that the incidental killing of dolphins shall not exceed a
rate based on those killed by the United States. 104 The panel found
this requirement so unpredictable that the measure could not be
"primarily aimed at" the conservation of dolphins.105
The "primarily aimed at" test is stringent.106 Moreover, the nar-
row reading of the test poses a serious threat to many U.S. environ-
mental laws that regulate one product in order to conserve
another. 107
A restrictive measure must be enacted in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption to be valid under the
exhaustible natural resources exception.lOS This exception was not
McDorman, supra note 84, at 518 (quoting Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific
Coast Salmon and Herring, CDA 89-180701, at 1, 22 (Free Trade Panel)).
98. Canada-Herring Panel, supra note 97, at 114.
99. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 46.
100. Id.
101. Id. The panel stated that measures relating to the conservation of exhaus-
tible natural resources must be "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic produc-
tion or consumption." Moreover, these restrictions must be aimed at supporting
restrictions "within their jurisdiction." Id. at 46-47.
102. Id. at 47.
103. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
104. Id.
105. U.S. Tuna panel, supra note 7, at 47.
106. See McDORMAN, supra note 84, at 519.
107. McDORMAN, supra note 84, at 519. The author discusses the "primarily
aimed at" test in conjunction with several acts that prohibit imports of certain prod-
ucts, including the Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, Endangered Species Act, and
the MMPA. The author suggests that a prohibition would be in violation of the "pri-
marily aimed at test" because the product banned is not the product being con-
served. Id.
108. GATT, supra note I, art. XX(g), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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intended to apply extraterritorially.109 Accordingly, the panel stated
that a measure with extraterritorial applications can be considered to
be enacted in conjunction with a domestic measure only if the mea-
sure was primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources within the country's jurisdiction. 110 The GATF panel con-
cluded that the U.S. prohibition of Mexican tuna was not enacted in
conjunction with domestic restriction.III
The panel noted that the exhaustible natural resources exception
allows contracting parties to adopt their own conservation poli-
cies. 112 If the extraterritorial application of the exhaustible natural
resources exception was adopted, as the United States suggested,
each contracting party could set a conservation policy from which no
other contracting party could deviate without jeopardizing compli-
ance with GATT.' 13 As a result, the benefits of GATT would apply
to only those countries with identical internal restrictions. In such a
case the multilateral framework of GATT would be jeopardized.114
The panel found that the exhaustible natural resources exception
could not justify the U.S. prohibition on the importation of Mexican
tuna.1 15 The tuna panel concluded that the MMPA was not consis-
tent with GATT and found no acceptable manner in which to accom-
modate its environmental goals.
IV. PROPOSAL
In its present form, GATF is ill-equipped to accommodate the
evolving relationship between international trade and environmental
conservation. The tuna panel decision highlights the growing link
between trade and environmental issues. This link should not be ig-
nored; rather, trade and environmental conservation should have
common goals.
109. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 47.
110. Id. This criteria was dispositive for the Canada-U.S. Tuna Panel. See Can-
ada-U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 63, at 109.
The Canada-U.S. tuna panel held that the U.S. measures restricting tuna were
not equal in strength or aim to those imposed against Canada.
[Tihe Panel examined the compatibility of the U.S. measures with paragraph
(g) of Article XX but "could not accept it to be justified that the United
States prohibition of imports of all tuna products from Canada ... had been
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on United States domestic
production or consumption on all tuna and tuna products."
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 54, at XX-9.
111. U.S. Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 47.
112. Id.
113. Id. In actuality, the countries with the largest purchasing power would con-
trol the conservation measures of the smaller states. To export to the United States,
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In the Mexico-U.S. tuna panel decision, free trade worked to the
disadvantage of U.S. environmental concerns. This decision illus-
trates a larger problem. Free trade may cause environmental decline
in some situations, and thus decrease the standard of living of mem-
ber nations.' 16 Therefore, in some situations, environmental restric-
tions on trade may be necessary to accomplish GATT objectives.
At least two things must occur to link environmental conservation
with international trade. First, the dispute resolution mechanism of
GATT must change from a power-oriented to a rule-oriented basis.
Second, GATT must recognize that trade affects the environment. 117
This can be achieved through an environmental code delineating the
relationship.
A. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
GATT provides a means of resolving disputes that arise from its
substantive provisions.'18 Most of the provisions require negotia-
tion or consultation.,19 If the negotiations do not resolve the dis-
pute or if there is no existing method of dispute settlement in the
applicable article, the parties must then look to article XXIII.120
116. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 3-4.
117. Seeid. at 18-19.
118. See PIERRE PESCATORE, HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 62 (Wil-
liam J. Davey & Andreas F. Lowenfeld eds., 1991).
119. Id. at 62.
120. Article XXIII can be invoked if a contracting party claims its benefit under
GATT is being "nullified or impaired" by another contracting party or if any objec-
tive of the GAIT is being impeded. ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 162 (1975).
The GATT states three means by which nullification or impairment may occur:
(a) [T]he failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether
or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a
view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representa-
tions or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it consid-
ers to be concerned.
GAIT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A64-A65, 55 U.N.T.S at 266-69.
The first step in resolving a dispute is negotiation. If the negotiation fails, article
XXIII calls for the contracting parties to promptly investigate the matter and give
recommendations or a ruling on the disputed matter. Id.
The burden of proof may be on either the petitioner or respondent. A prima
facie case for nullification or impairment is made simply by alleging a violation of
GAIT. The burden of proof is on the violating party to show their actions were
justified. Where no violation is shown, the burden is on the complainant because the
contracting parties have been uncomfortable with the idea that actions consistent
with GATT may still result in nullification or impairment. PESCATORE, supra note
118, at 63.
Normally, the contracting parties investigate through a dispute panel. Reif, supra
note 6, at 590-91. The panel reviews the facts of the dispute, analyzes the GATT
1992]
17
Hooley: Resolving Conflicts between the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Article XXIII is vague as to the proper method for settling dis-
putes. 12 1 As a result, there has been much confusion about the ap-
propriate role of the dispute panel. There are two primary views.
First, some GAT members view dispute resolution as merely a step
in the negotiation process.' 22 This is called the power-oriented
model.123 Proponents of this model include Japan and the European
Community. 124
The power-oriented model is based on economic strength.125
Countries with more economic power possess the upper hand in ne-
gotiating a resolution.' 26 Smaller nations are forced to negotiate at a
disadvantage and therefore rarely achieve beneficial results. 127 As a
result, less powerful nations gradually lose their ability to formulate
independent trade policy. Under this model, GATT represents a
commitment to work out a solution to any dispute that may arise, but
it is not viewed as a body of rules.128
The second view of dispute resolution is the rule-oriented
model. 129 The rule-oriented model, advocated by the United States,
gives deference to GATT as a body of rules. 13O A rule-oriented dis-
pute resolution mechanism is preferable to a power-based system for
several reasons.
Most importantly, a rule-oriented, or legalistic, dispute resolution
mechanism lends predictability to the outcome of a given dispute.131
The primary objective of a dispute resolution mechanism is to give
rules, and recommends a solution to the contracting parties. Lisa Sue Klaiman, Ap-
plying GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedures to a Trade in Services Agreement: Proceed With Cau-
tion, 13 U. PA.J. INr'L Bus. L. 657, 662-63 (1990).
Article XXIII indicates that the preferable remedy is one that is mutually agreea-
ble to the disputing parties. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 54, at XXIII-64. If
no such solution is found, the panel should secure a withdrawal of offending meas-
ures. There is, however, a provision in GATT that has been interpreted to allow
monetary compensation to the winning nation. This provision is resorted to only if
the offending measure is not easily removed. Lastly, article XXIII authorizes retalia-
tory measures by the contracting party. Action under this last remedy has rarely
been taken. Id.
121. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. at A64-A65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 226-69.
122. PESCATORE, supra note 118, at 71. Phan van Phi, A European View of the GATT,
14 Irr'L Bus. LAW. 150 (1986).
123. PESCATORE, supra note 118, at 70-71. See also, WilliamJ. Davey, Dispute Settle-
ment in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 51, 55 (1987).
124. PESCATORE, supra note 118, at 71.
125. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 6, at 47-48.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. PESCATORE, supra note 118, at 71.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 72.
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credence and enforcement to those rules.13 2 Members can rely on
the rules as they are written and interpreted by side codes. Further-
more, a rule-oriented approach applies more equitably than a power-
based system because the rules apply to all members in the same way
regardless of the economic power of the parties.
A frequent concern about a rule-oriented approach is that an im-
portant case will be decided incorrectly.133 To avoid an aberrant de-
cision, a procedure of appellate review should be instituted.134
Parties, under this system, would have an automatic right of appeal
to a GATF constitutional body, which would have limited powers to
review the ruling in terms of consistency with GATF.
Recognizing environmental conservation as a legitimate GATT
policy possesses the risk of protectionism. Unilateral environmental
conservation measures can disguise protectionism.135 A rule-ori-
ented dispute resolution mechanism in conjunction with an environ-
mental code would diminish the threat of protectionism in
environmental measures that affect international trade.
B. The Environmental Code
In addition to the procedural reform discussed above, GATT
would require substantive reform to accommodate environmental
concerns. The contracting parties may amend GAFF,136 but it is a
difficult process.' 3 7 Theoretically, the amendment is binding only
on those parties that accept and ratify it. 138 As a result, amendment
has not been favored by GAT members.139
Alternatively, GATT permits the development of side codes. 140
132. See id. at 71.
133. Id. at 73.
134. See id. at 74.
135. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
136. Article XXV:5 states:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agree-
ment, the contracting parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a con-
tacting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be
approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority
shall comprise more than half of the contracting parties. The contracting
parties may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which
other voting requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of
this paragraph.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV:5, 61 Stat. at A68-A69, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272-75.
137. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GA-T, supra note 6, at 25. Amendment requires a
two-thirds acceptance by all contracting parties in most cases. Even then, the amend-
ment is binding on only those contracting parties that accept it. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 24.
140. Id. at 25.
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Side codes are special treaties that enlarge and interpret the law of
GATT. 141 An environmental side code would be regarded as a sepa-
rate treaty and would require an approval independent from
GATT.142 Membership in GATT would not be affected by the envi-
ronmental code.14
3
An environmental code that sets out specific interpretations of ar-
ticles III, XI, and XX with regard to domestic environmental regula-
tion would allow GAF to accommodate the conflict between trade
and environmental concerns.1 44 The Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXII of GATT could serve
as a model for an environmental code. 14 5
The code would necessarily contain several measures to remain
consistent with the existing GAT provisions. In the preamble, the
proposed environmental code should recognize that environmental
policies are used by governments to preserve and improve the stan-
dard of living. The preamble should also recognize that environ-
mental regulation is potentially restrictive to the free flow of goods.
The principal goal of the environmental code should be to inter-
pret articles III, XI, and XX in a manner that accommodates environ-
mental conservation. The code must ensure that the application of
such measures does not unjustifiably impede international trade.
The code should include the following interpretations of articles III,
XI, and XX to accomplish these objectives.
Article III should be enlarged to include domestic environmental
regulation. Therefore, the national treatment obligation which
141. Id.
142. Id. The Most-favoured-nation provision may bar countries from treating
member nations differently due to their acceptance of a side code. However, not all
side codes would fall under the MFN provision. An "understanding" is another form
of a general obligation that may arise from article XXV. It is not a separate treaty and
does not require a nation to sign or ratify it. Id. at 28-29.
143. Id. The concepts of amendment and side code may be combined in a single
model. Under this model, a side code would bind only nations that choose to sign it.
When and if two-thirds of the member nations sign the code, it becomes an amend-
ment to GATT. Whether amendments are binding on those who do not accept them,
however, is unresolved. Id. at 25-26.
144. This idea is similar to one proposed by Montana Senator Max Baucus.
Baucus suggested the following criteria be included in such a code: (1) The environ-
mental protection standards applied must have a sound scientific basis; (2) The same
standards must be applied to all competitive domestic production; (3) The imported
products must be causing economic injury to competitive domestic production.
Baucus Calls for GA TT Environmental Code Modeled After Subsides Code, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) (Oct. 28, 1991).
145. Commonly referred to as the subsidies code, the Agreement on Interpreta-
tion and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXII of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade merely designates an interpretation of the articles mentioned with
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states that imported products shall not be subject to internal charges
of any kind in excess of those applied to like domestic products,
should be interpreted to allow a government to equalize the effects
of environmental restrictions. In this manner, domestic producers
will not be penalized for their compliance with environmental regu-
lations that increase the cost of production. Consequently, GATT
would no longer give a trade advantage to the country with the most
permissive environmental regulations.
The requirements of the environmental code should not apply be-
yond the territory of the regulating country. For example, in the
U.S.-Mexico tuna case, this code would permit the United States to
impose a tax on tuna imports to equalize the cost of production. It
would not, however, allow the United States to impose specific re-
quirements on Mexican fishing techniques. As a result, Mexico
would be subject to the extraterritorial effects of U.S. environmental
legislation only to the extent that it affected domestic producers.
The potential for protectionism would be limited because the code
would allow only the burden of environmental regulations to be
equalized. In an effort to curb any tendencies toward protectionism,
however, the code should be the binding interpretation of article III
with regard to environmental conservation. The definite interpreta-
tion would add predictability to the code and thereby diminish oppo-
sition to it based on the threat of protectionism. Article III: I
disallows any domestic legislation with protectionist intent. 146 The
enlarged interpretation of article III would allow GATT to accom-
modate domestic environmental concerns while avoiding unneces-
sary restrictions on international trade.
Article XI, which limits quantitative restrictions, should be inter-
preted to include bona fide environmental regulations that employ
quantitative restrictions to equalize the effects of the regulations.
Article XI needs little change to accommodate domestic environ-
mental regulation affecting agricultural or fisheries products and
should not be included in the code beyond that scope. Article
X:2(c)(i) states that an import restriction on agricultural or fisheries
products will be consistent with GATT if the restriction is necessary
to the success of a domestic restriction on a like product.147
The Canada-U.S. Ice Cream Panel devised a framework for analy-
sis that is helpful in determining whether the exception to quantita-
tive restrictions applies. 148 To accommodate environmental
concerns, the exception should be invoked only when the following
requirements are met:
146. GATT, supra note 1, art. II:l, 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S at 204-06.
147. Id. art. XI:2(c)(i), 61 Stat. at A33, 55 U.N.T.S at 226.
148. Canada-U.S. Ice Cream Panel, supra note 74, at 85-86.
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1. the measure must constitute a restriction, not a prohibition on
importation of the product;
2. the import restriction must be on an agricultural or fishery
product;
3. the import, domestic marketing, or production restriction must
apply to "like" products in any form to include directly substi-
tutable products if there is no substantial production of the like
product;
4. there must be governmental measures which operate to restrict
the quantities of domestic product permitted to be marketed or
produced.
5. the import restriction must be necessary to the enforcement of
the domestic supply restriction;
6. the contracting party applying restrictions on importation must
give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product
permitted to be imported during a specified future period; and
7. the restrictions applied must not reduce the proportion of total
of imports relative to total domestic production, as compared
with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to
rule between the two in the absence of restrictions.1 4 9
This analysis of the article XI:2(c)(i) agricultural and fisheries excep-
tion would allow a dispute panel to identify a valid environmental
regulation of agricultural or fisheries products.
With regard to article XX, the environmental code would be lim-
ited to sections XX(b), XX(g), and the preamble.150 The code would
allow each contracting party to adopt its own conservation policies
aimed at the protection of human, animal or plant life or health.
Furthermore, the life or health exception would apply only to the
extent necessary for the success of environmental regulation within
the importing country. This would minimize the extraterritorial im-
plications of article XX(b) while maintaining the continuity of do-
mestic environmental regulation.
In the Mexico-U.S. tuna case, the panel stated that GATT allows
each contracting party to legislate its environmental policy.151 The
panel noted that an extraterritorial interpretation of the life or health
exception would diminish the multilateral nature of GATT.152 The
proposed environmental code would be consistent with the panel's
decision up to this point. In addition, the code would equalize the
additional cost of catching tuna incurred by United States fishers due
to the MMPA. Therefore, the United States would not be penalized
for enacting environmental protection laws, and Mexico would be
free to formulate its own environmental policy. Moreover, Mexico's
149. Id. (interpreting the requirements of articles XI:2(c)).
150. See supra note 79.
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competitive advantage as a result of its lower environmental protec-
tion would be eliminated only to the extent necessary to equalize the
cost incurred by U.S. fishers.
The environmental code should accommodate environmental con-
cerns while minimizing restrictions on trade. This can be achieved
by requiring that a restriction on trade be primarily aimed at conser-
vation of natural resources within the jurisdiction of the enacting
country. Article XX(g) states that any restriction on international
trade must be enacted in conjunction with a restriction on domestic
production or consumption.153 A GATT panel has found that a re-
striction on trade must be primarily aimed at the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources within the jurisdiction of the enacting
country. 154 Moreover, both articles XX(b) and XX(g) disallow extra-
territorial applications.155
V. CONCLUSION
The Mexico-U.S. tuna case illustrates the conflict between interna-
tional trade and environmental conservation. The tuna panel
reached the correct legal conclusion because GATT is unable to ac-
commodate environmental concerns. But the better response to the
conflict between free trade and environmental conservation is a sub-
stantive and procedural reform of GATT. Procedurally, a rule-ori-
ented dispute resolution mechanism would give dispute panels
additional authority to enhance the effectiveness of the environmen-
tal code. The dispute panels would then have the authority to distin-
guish between protectionism and valid environmental conservation
policies. Substantively, an environmental code would provide an
agreed-upon interpretation of articles III, XI, and XX that would al-
low dispute panels to consider environmental conservation in resolv-
ing conflicts. The procedural and substantive reforms would
substantially diminish the conflict between the environment and
trade.
Mark T Hooley
153. See supra note 79.
154. Canada-U.S. Ice Cream Panel, supra note 74, at 85-86.
155. See supra note 79.
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